{"id":175279,"date":"2023-07-15T01:39:51","date_gmt":"2023-07-15T05:39:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/tierramarillano.cl\/?p=175279"},"modified":"2023-07-15T01:39:51","modified_gmt":"2023-07-15T05:39:51","slug":"cincuenta-anos-tensiones-y-desconfianzas","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/tierramarillano.cl\/newweb\/2023\/07\/15\/cincuenta-anos-tensiones-y-desconfianzas\/","title":{"rendered":"Cincuenta A\u00f1os Tensiones y Desconfianzas"},"content":{"rendered":"

Por Ulises Carabantes Ahumada<\/p>\n

Ingeniero Civil Industrial. Analista de actualidad. Escritor.<\/p>\n

(At the end of the spanish text you will find the english translation)<\/p>\n

Estimado lector, en las pr\u00f3ximas l\u00edneas podr\u00e1 leer un muy breve pero descriptivo resumen de algunos cap\u00edtulos del libro Chile 1973<\/strong>. Quien quiera profundizar en esta materia y desee comprar el libro, consulte al correo ucarabantes@gmail.com<\/a>, para las ediciones en Chile como tambi\u00e9n en Espa\u00f1a. Esta es la quinta de trece publicaciones sabatinas que efectuar\u00e9 hasta el s\u00e1bado 9 de septiembre.<\/p>\n

En medio de las tensiones provocadas por el proyecto educacional del gobierno denominado Escuela Nacional Unificada, ENU, el 19 de abril de 1973 se inici\u00f3 la huelga de los trabajadores de la mina de cobre El Teniente, movimiento gremial que tendr\u00eda una larga duraci\u00f3n y que, a\u00fan siendo focalizado en la Provincia de O\u00b4Higgins y Santiago, tuvo una gran repercusi\u00f3n pol\u00edtica a nivel nacional y profundizando los quiebres internos que hab\u00edan en la Unidad Popular. Durante mayo se produjeron violentos enfrentamientos en Santiago entre Patria y Libertad y grupos de izquierda, frente a lo cual el gobierno decret\u00f3 el Estado de Emergencia. La pugna entre los poderes del Estado era evidente y permanente. La C\u00e1mara de Diputados acus\u00f3 constitucionalmente al ministro de miner\u00eda Sergio Bitar y al ministro del trabajo Lu\u00eds Figueroa, por no dar soluci\u00f3n y terminar con la huelga de los mineros de El Teniente.\"\"Nuevamente no hubo acuerdo entre el gobierno y el congreso en lo que se refer\u00eda a definir legalmente las llamadas \u201c\u00e1reas de la econom\u00eda\u201d. El tribunal constitucional se declar\u00f3 sin competencia para resolver tal contienda, manteni\u00e9ndose la situaci\u00f3n de quedar la estructura productiva de Chile al arbitrio del gobierno o peor a\u00fan, bajo el arbitrio de agitadores de izquierda que paralizaban y tomaban f\u00e1bricas y otras unidades de producci\u00f3n, lo que manten\u00eda el desabastecimiento y el caos general en la econom\u00eda.<\/strong>\"\"Como se se\u00f1al\u00f3 anteriormente, por solicitud del presidente Salvador Allende, fuera de toda obligaci\u00f3n constitucional, el general Carlos Prats inici\u00f3 la serie de reuniones de car\u00e1cter pol\u00edtico con los partidos de la Unidad Popular, buscando que estos aceptaran una tregua con la oposici\u00f3n, a fin de evitar el sangriento enfrentamiento fratricida y terminar la crisis que viv\u00eda Chile sin derramamiento de sangre. En paralelo, socialistas como el ex canciller Clodomiro Almeyda manifestaban, al igual que el presidente de la rep\u00fablica, su visi\u00f3n de la necesidad de que las fuerzas armadas se incorporaran en labores de gobierno, pero el habitual interlocutor ante esta propuesta, como era Carlos Prats, manifestaba reiteradamente que para hacer factible nuevamente la incorporaci\u00f3n de las fuerzas armadas a los ministerios, era necesario que el gobierno hiciera concesiones en su programa. Tanto Allende como Almeyda respond\u00edan muy poco probable que los partidos de la izquierda quisieran hacer dichas concesiones ante la oposici\u00f3n y Prats respond\u00eda que en ese caso no era factible la incorporaci\u00f3n militar al gobierno pues aparecer\u00edan las fuerzas armadas tomando posici\u00f3n por uno de los bandos en pugna.<\/p>\n

El 7 de junio de 1973 el general Carlos Prats comenz\u00f3 a desarrollar la misi\u00f3n pol\u00edtica que se le hab\u00eda solicitado. Ese d\u00eda se reuni\u00f3 con la dirigencia de la Central \u00danica de Trabajadores, CUT, encabezada por el comunista Lu\u00eds Figueroa y el socialista Rolando Calder\u00f3n, quienes transparentaron su visi\u00f3n de fortalecer al gobierno con la incorporaci\u00f3n definitiva a \u00e9ste de las fuerzas armadas<\/strong> y de esta forma actuar con mayor fuerza frente a la oposici\u00f3n para combatir la inflaci\u00f3n y el desabastecimiento. Carlos Prats les respondi\u00f3 lo obvio, la inflaci\u00f3n y el desabastecimiento se combat\u00eda entregando la unidades productivas, f\u00e1bricas y campos, a quienes las sab\u00edan hacer producir,<\/strong> dejando de estar en manos de los agitadores pol\u00edticos de la Unidad Popular y del MIR, quienes ten\u00edan paralizadas dichas unidades productivas, someti\u00e9ndolas a interminables y est\u00e9riles asamble\u00edsmos.\"\"El mismo 7 de junio se reuni\u00f3 Carlos Prats con la dirigencia del partido socialista, con el secretario general de este partido, Carlos Altamirano, en presencia de carlos Lazo, Hern\u00e1n del Canto, Rolando Calder\u00f3n y Adonis Sep\u00falveda, el mismo que en 1965 levant\u00f3 al tesis insurreccional aprobada por los socialistas en su congreso general de junio de ese a\u00f1o.\u00a0 Carlos Altamirano fue muy claro con Prats, expuso la visi\u00f3n de su partido, que distaba enormemente de la visi\u00f3n que el presidente Allende le hab\u00eda manifestado al mismo general, la que era lograr un acuerdo con la oposici\u00f3n a trav\u00e9s de concesiones program\u00e1ticas por parte de la Unidad Popular, para as\u00ed establecer una tregua pol\u00edtica que alejara el l\u00fagubre fantasma de una guerra civil. Altamirano expres\u00f3 a Prats que los socialistas no estaban por hacer concesiones de ning\u00fan tipo a la oposici\u00f3n, es decir, no eran partidarios de dar el paso que permitiera a Allende salvar su gobierno. Muy por el contrario, Altamirano le se\u00f1al\u00f3 al general Carlos Prats que las fuerzas armadas deb\u00edan ponerse del lado \u201cdel pueblo\u201d, entendi\u00e9ndose como \u201cel pueblo\u201d al sector que hab\u00eda obtenido el 43% de los sufragios en las elecciones parlamentarias de marzo de 1973; es decir, a los seguidores de la Unidad Popular. Si el socialista Carlos Altamirano consideraba leg\u00edtima la intervenci\u00f3n de las fuerzas armadas a favor \u201cdel pueblo\u201d del 43%; \u00bfpor qu\u00e9 no pod\u00eda ser leg\u00edtima una intervenci\u00f3n de las fuerzas armadas a favor del pueblo que ten\u00eda el mayoritario 57%? En resumen, Carlos Altamirano estaba proponiendo el definitivo quiebre democr\u00e1tico para Chile, por tres caminos, una dictadura marxista apoyada por las fuerzas armadas o una dictadura anti marxista apoyada tambi\u00e9n por las fuerzas armadas o sencillamente la guerra civil si las fuerzas armadas interven\u00edan militarmente en forma dividida.<\/p>\n

En la tarde del 8 de junio de 1973 el general Carlos Prats se reuni\u00f3 con los dirigentes del MAPU Enrique Correa, Jaime Gazmuri y Fernando Flores. Tras repetir su planteamiento de la urgente necesidad de un acuerdo con la oposici\u00f3n, Carlos Prats recibi\u00f3 como respuesta de estos tres pol\u00edticos su incredulidad respecto de que fuera factible la aceptaci\u00f3n de la tregua por el sector mas derechista de la democracia cristiana, como as\u00ed tambi\u00e9n por parte de los sectores m\u00e1s radicalizados hacia la izquierda de la Unidad Popular. A esta visi\u00f3n del MAPU habr\u00eda que agregar tambi\u00e9n la permanente presi\u00f3n del MIR sobre el gobierno, en su af\u00e1n revolucionario violentista que pon\u00eda en pr\u00e1ctica el \u201cavanzar sin tranzar\u201d que vociferaba. El mismo 8 de junio por la noche el general Carlos Prats se reuni\u00f3 con los dirigentes comunistas Lu\u00eds Corval\u00e1n, Volodia Teitelboim, Orlando Millas y Hugo D\u00edaz. Los comunistas se expresaron contrarios a un acuerdo con la oposici\u00f3n argumentando que aquello desorientar\u00eda y debilitar\u00eda las bases partidarias de la Unidad Popular. \u00a0En consecuencia, los comunistas tampoco se motraron de acuerdo con la tregua pol\u00edtica que ped\u00eda el presidente Salvador Allende,<\/strong> cerraban la puerta a la posibilidad de un acuerdo con la oposici\u00f3n para impedir el golpe militar que con franqueza les anunciaba el comandante en jefe del ej\u00e9rcito Carlos Prats. Habr\u00eda que haberle preguntado a los testarudos l\u00edderes de la UP, \u00bfqu\u00e9 debilitar\u00eda m\u00e1s a las bases partidarias de su coalici\u00f3n, un acuerdo con la oposici\u00f3n o una intervenci\u00f3n militar como la que ocurrir\u00eda el 11 de septiembre de 1973?<\/p>\n

El comandante en jefe del ej\u00e9rcito transmiti\u00f3 el fracaso que estaba teniendo en su gesti\u00f3n pol\u00edtica a su subalterno m\u00e1s directo, el jefe de estado mayor del ej\u00e9rcito, general de divisi\u00f3n Augusto Pinochet. Este manifest\u00f3 su visi\u00f3n ante Prats en el sentido de que la crisis que viv\u00eda Chile deb\u00eda tener una soluci\u00f3n de car\u00e1cter pol\u00edtico, sin dejar de expresar una alerta, la posibilidad que la oficialidad del ej\u00e9rcito exigiera un pronunciamiento de la instituci\u00f3n ante la grave crisis que se viv\u00eda. Veinte d\u00edas despu\u00e9s vino el \u201ctancazo\u201d, ya referido en esta serie de publicaciones.\"\"<\/p>\n

En consecuencia Prats fracas\u00f3 en su intento pol\u00edtico de bajar la intensidad de enfrentamiento de los dos bandos en pugna, enfrentamiento que era condici\u00f3n fundamental para que Chile cayera en una guerra civil.<\/strong> Esta \u00faltima se concretar\u00eda definitivamente con una intervenci\u00f3n militar fraccionada, dividida, a favor de uno y otro bando, como lo esperaban en su dise\u00f1o el frente nacionalista patria y libertad y por el lado de la izquierda, el partido comunista, el partido socialista y el MIR. Desde ese momento en adelante s\u00f3lo esperaba a Chile la guerra civil o que los altos mandos de las fuerzas armadas lograran ejecutar una intervenci\u00f3n militar monol\u00edtica, unida, para terminar con el caos generalizado imperante. Dicha intervenci\u00f3n se produjo el 11 de septiembre de 1973.\"\"<\/p>\n

La tarde del 15 de junio hubo violentos enfrentamientos en la zona c\u00e9ntrica de Santiago, en el contexto de la huelga de los trabajadores de la mina El Teniente. El senador dem\u00f3crata cristiano llam\u00f3 por tel\u00e9fono al general Prats se\u00f1al\u00e1ndole temer un ataque a la sede de su partido, que carabineros estaba sobrepasado y que el comunista Lu\u00eds Figueroa, presidente de la CUT y el socialista Jorge Arrate, vicepresidente de CODELCO, pretend\u00edan bloquear el acuerdo que el presidente Allende intentaba con los huelguistas.<\/p>\n

Al d\u00eda siguiente fueron ratificados los dichos de Aylwin respecto de Lu\u00eds Figueroa y Jorge Arrate, pues la comisi\u00f3n pol\u00edtica del partido comunista y la comisi\u00f3n pol\u00edtica del partido socialista emitieron una dura cr\u00edtica al presidente Salvador Allende a trav\u00e9s del diario comunista El Siglo, declaraci\u00f3n en la cual ambos partidos se\u00f1alaron que el di\u00e1logo con los dirigentes mineros que carec\u00edan de representatividad era inconducente y que s\u00f3lo la combatividad de las masas (comunistas y socialistas) era v\u00e1lida para dar t\u00e9rmino al problema. Allende tuvo que dar explicaciones p\u00fablicas a ambos partidos de izquierda.<\/p>\n

En paralelo, Carlos Prats ve\u00eda aumentar la desconfianza hacia su liderazgo dentro del cuerpo de generales del ej\u00e9rcito. Posterior al \u201ctancazo\u201d el alto amndo de la armada solicit\u00f3 una reuni\u00f3n conjunta con generales del ej\u00e9rcito y la fuerza a\u00e9rea con el fin de \u201corientarse de la situaci\u00f3n que se vive y uniformar criterios\u201d.<\/p>\n

Si durante las trece publicaciones de este ciclo hist\u00f3rico, alguno de mis lectores se interesa en tener el libro Chile 1973; tanto para la edici\u00f3n en Chile como en Espa\u00f1a, pueden hacer llegar su consulta al correo electr\u00f3nico ucarabantes@gmail.com<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Los espero el pr\u00f3ximo s\u00e1bado 22 de julio con la sexta publicaci\u00f3n hist\u00f3rica, la que llevar\u00e1 por t\u00edtulo Cincuenta A\u00f1os: Inclinaci\u00f3n por la Violencia<\/u><\/strong>.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Fifty Years<\/strong>
\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Tensions and Distrust<\/strong>
\nBy Ulises Carabantes Ahumada<\/strong>
\nIndustrial Civil Engineer. Current Affairs Analyst. Writer.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Dear reader, in the following lines, you will be able to read a very brief but descriptive summary of some chapters from the book ‘Chile 1973’. For those who wish to delve deeper into this matter and want to purchase the book, please contact\u00a0ucarabantes@gmail.com<\/a> for editions available in Chile and Spain. This is the fifth out of thirteen Saturday publications that I will be releasing until Saturday, September 9th.<\/p>\n

Amidst the tensions caused by the government’s educational project called the National Unified School, ENU, the strike of workers at the El Teniente copper mine began on April 19, 1973. This labor movement had a long duration and, even though it was focused mainly in the O’Higgins Province and Santiago, it had a significant political impact nationwide, deepening the internal ruptures within the Popular Unity. Violent clashes occurred in Santiago in May between Patria y Libertad (homeland and freedom) and left-wing groups, prompting the government to declare a state of emergency. The power struggle between the branches of the State was evident and constant. The Chamber of Deputies constitutionally accused the Minister of Mining, Sergio Bitar, and the Minister of Labor, Lu\u00eds Figueroa, for failing to provide a solution and end the strike of the El Teniente miners.<\/p>\n

Once again, no agreement was reached between the government and the Congress regarding the legal definition of the so-called ‘economic areas.’ The Constitutional Court declared itself incompetent to resolve this dispute, thus maintaining the situation where Chile’s productive structure was left to the government’s discretion or worse, to the discretion of left-wing agitators who were causing work stoppages and taking over factories and other production units, resulting in shortages and general chaos in the economy.<\/p>\n

As previously mentioned, at the request of President Salvador Allende, outside of any constitutional obligation, General Carlos Prats initiated a series of political meetings with the parties of the Popular Unity. The goal was to persuade them to accept a truce with the opposition in order to avoid a bloody fratricidal confrontation and end the crisis in Chile without bloodshed. In parallel, socialists like former Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda expressed, just like the President, their view of the need for the armed forces to be involved in governmental tasks. However, the usual interlocutor for this proposal, Carlos Prats, repeatedly stated that for the reintegration of the armed forces into the ministries to be feasible, the government needed to make concessions in its program. Both Allende and Almeyda responded that it was highly unlikely that leftist parties would be willing to make such concessions to the opposition. Prats replied that in that case, the military’s incorporation into the government would not be feasible, as it would appear that the armed forces were taking sides in the conflict.<\/p>\n

On June 7, 1973, General Carlos Prats began to carry out the political mission he had been assigned. That day, he met with the leadership of the Central \u00danica de Trabajadores (Unified Workers’ Central), CUT, led by the communist Luis Figueroa and the socialist Rolando Calder\u00f3n. They expressed their vision of strengthening the government by definitively incorporating the armed forces into it, thereby acting more forcefully against the opposition to combat inflation and shortages. Carlos Prats pointed out the obvious to them: inflation and shortages could be combated by handing over productive units, factories, and fields to those who knew how to make them productive, rather than being in the hands of political agitators from the Popular Unity and the MIR, who had paralyzed these productive units, subjecting them to endless and fruitless assemblies.<\/p>\n

On the same day, Carlos Prats met with the leadership of the Socialist Party, including its General Secretary Carlos Altamirano, in the presence of Carlos Lazo, Hern\u00e1n del Canto, Rolando Calder\u00f3n, and Adonis Sep\u00falveda. It is worth noting that Adonis Sep\u00falveda was the same person who in 1965 proposed the insurrectional thesis approved by the socialists at their general congress that same year. Carlos Altamirano was very clear with Prats, expressing his party’s vision, which greatly differed from the vision President Allende had conveyed to the general. Altamirano’s vision was to achieve an agreement with the opposition through programmatic concessions from the Popular Unity, in order to establish a political truce that would dispel the gloomy specter of a civil war. Altamirano told Prats that the socialists were not inclined to make any concessions to the opposition, meaning they were not in favor of taking the step that would allow Allende to save his government. On the contrary, Altamirano told General Carlos Prats that the armed forces should stand on the side of “the people,” understanding “the people” as the sector that had obtained 43% of the votes in the parliamentary elections of March 1973, in other words, the followers of the Popular Unity. If the socialist Carlos Altamirano considered the intervention of the armed forces on behalf of the 43% “people” legitimate, why couldn’t an intervention of the armed forces on behalf of the majority 57% “people” also be legitimate? In summary, Carlos Altamirano was proposing the definitive democratic rupture for Chile through three paths: a Marxist dictatorship supported by the armed forces, an anti-Marxist dictatorship also supported by the armed forces, or simply civil war if the armed forces intervened militarily in a divided manner.<\/p>\n

On the afternoon of June 8, 1973, General Carlos Prats met with the leaders of the MAPU party, Enrique Correa, Jaime Gazmuri, and Fernando Flores. After reiterating the urgent need for an agreement with the opposition, Carlos Prats received disbelief from these three politicians regarding the feasibility of the right-wing sector of the Christian Democracy accepting a ceasefire, as well as the more radicalized sectors of the Left of the Popular Unity. This view from the MAPU also had to take into account the constant pressure from the MIR on the government, with their revolutionary and violent approach of “advancing without compromise.”<\/p>\n

Later that same evening of June 8, General Carlos Prats met with Communist leaders Lu\u00eds Corval\u00e1n, Volodia Teitelboim, Orlando Millas, and Hugo D\u00edaz. The Communists expressed their opposition to an agreement with the opposition, arguing that it would disorient and weaken the party bases of the Popular Unity. Consequently, the Communists were also not in agreement with the political truce requested by President Salvador Allende. They closed the door to the possibility of an agreement with the opposition to prevent the military coup that the Army Commander-in-Chief, Carlos Prats, frankly announced to them. One might have asked the stubborn leaders of the Popular Unity, what would weaken the party bases of their coalition more: an agreement with the opposition or a military intervention like the one that would occur on September 11, 1973?<\/p>\n

The Army Commander-in-Chief conveyed his political failure to his direct subordinate, the Army Chief of Staff, Major General Augusto Pinochet. Pinochet expressed his view to Prats that the crisis affecting Chile needed a political solution, while also raising the possibility that the army’s officers might demand an institutional pronouncement regarding the grave crisis being experienced. Twenty days later came the “tancazo,” already referred to in this series of publications.<\/p>\n

As a result, Prats failed in his political attempt to reduce the intensity of the confrontation between the two warring sides, a confrontation that was a fundamental condition for Chile to fall into a civil war. This civil war would ultimately materialize with a fractured and divided military intervention, supporting one side or the other, as anticipated in their design by the nationalist “Patria y Libertad” front and, on the left, the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and the MIR. From that moment onwards, Chile could only expect either a civil war or the high-ranking commanders of the armed forces executing a unified military intervention to end the prevailing generalized chaos. Such an intervention took place on September 11, 1973.<\/p>\n

On the afternoon of June 15, violent clashes occurred in the downtown area of Santiago, in the context of the strike by El Teniente mine workers. A Christian Democrat senator phoned General Prats, expressing concern about an attack on his party’s headquarters, stating that the police were overwhelmed and that Communist leader Lu\u00eds Figueroa, President of the CUT (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores), and Socialist Jorge Arrate, Vice President of CODELCO, intended to block the agreement that President Allende was attempting to reach with the striking workers.<\/p>\n

The following day, the statements made by Aylwin regarding Lu\u00eds Figueroa and Jorge Arrate were confirmed, as both the Communist Party’s political commission and the Socialist Party’s political commission issued a harsh critique of President Salvador Allende through the Communist newspaper El Siglo. In that declaration, both parties stated that dialogue with the non-representative mining leaders was futile and that only the combativeness of the masses (Communists and Socialists) was valid in ending the problem. Allende had to provide public explanations to both left-wing parties.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, Carlos Prats saw the distrust towards his leadership increase within the ranks of the Army generals. After the “tancazo,” the high command of the Navy requested a joint meeting with Army and Air Force generals in order to “assess the situation being experienced and unify criteria.”<\/p>\n

If, during the thirteen publications of this historical series, any of my readers are interested in obtaining the book Chile 1973, both for the edition in Chile and Spain, they can send their inquiries to the email address ucarabantes@gmail.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n

I will see you next Saturday, July 22, with the sixth historical publication, which will be titled “Fifty Years: Inclination towards Violence.” \t<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Por Ulises Carabantes Ahumada Ingeniero Civil Industrial. Analista de actualidad. Escritor. (At the end of the spanish text you will find the english translation) Estimado lector, en las pr\u00f3ximas l\u00edneas podr\u00e1 leer un muy breve pero descriptivo resumen de algunos cap\u00edtulos del libro Chile 1973. Quien quiera profundizar en esta materia y desee comprar el […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":175286,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-175279","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-columna-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/tierramarillano.cl\/newweb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/175279","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/tierramarillano.cl\/newweb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/tierramarillano.cl\/newweb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tierramarillano.cl\/newweb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tierramarillano.cl\/newweb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=175279"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/tierramarillano.cl\/newweb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/175279\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tierramarillano.cl\/newweb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/175286"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/tierramarillano.cl\/newweb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=175279"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tierramarillano.cl\/newweb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=175279"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tierramarillano.cl\/newweb\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=175279"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}